Today, SocGen’s Internal Audit report seems to indicate that contrary to my own speculations in a previous post, Jerome K. did not break into the computer systems, and did not use other people’s ID to transact. So how did he manage ? The autopsy of the string of treasury and cash transfers from the front office black box might give an answer, but now we are dealing with other parameters as well: is the truth worth the mangling of one of France’s most performing banks? worth endangering thousands of more competent - and innocent - people’s jobs?
In Social economics calculus ( shades of Jeremy Bentham) may lie the first steps to solve the squaring of the circle.

In this kind of situation, where reports raise more new questions than answer previous issues, more speculation is inept, so I will stop. But it will still be useful, in an Operational Risk ennvironment, to investigate the consequences of a real intrusion into the controlling and transaction systems of a Front Office. If Jerome K. did not do it, somebody someday will…